The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery poses possibly the greatest potential threat to international security. That is why the European Union emphasized in its Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction adopted in 2003 that a multilateralist approach focusing on both disarmament and non-proliferation provided the best way to maintain security and international order.
In this light the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is and remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The European Union is committed to the NPT regime and actively supports measures designed to strengthen it further.
In connection with the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference the European Union is already going ahead with substantial preparatory work within the Union. We are determined in 2007, too, to play an active and constructive role in the discussions due to take place in the Preparatory Committee.
Our goal for the European Union is that the NPT review cycle should begin in a constructive atmosphere. That is why the European Union explicitly welcomes the plans of the Chairman designate of the first session of the Preparatory Committee, Ambassador Amano of Japan.
In the review process now about to begin the European Union believes it is vital that balanced consideration should be given to all three pillars of the NPT (nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, peaceful uses of nuclear energy). Only a balance such as I have described will allow the next NPT review cycle to go forward with any success. That is essential, however, if the Review Conference is to adopt joint decisions designed to strengthen the Treaty regime.
The Common Position adopted by the European Union in connection with the 2005 Review Conference remains the basis of the EU's balanced approach to these issues.
Another important pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The early entry into force of this Treaty has long been an issue of major concern to the European Union and one which, following North Korea's nuclear test, has acquired even higher priority: Through Joint Actions designed to tighten up the Treaty's verification system the European Union is already helping to support the test ban regime.
The European Union is also calling for negotiations to start in the near future and without prior conditions on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The conclusion of such a treaty would be a milestone for nuclear arms control and disarmament. It would be a major contribution towards implementing the decisions jointly adopted by the NPT community at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.
The complete and whole-hearted fulfilment of all NPT obligations will remain a key requirement also in future for the consolidation and strengthening of the NPT regime.
That is particularly true as regards non-proliferation. In this connection special consideration should be given to regional aspects. As you know, the European Union is actively involved in efforts to resolve the crisis over Iran's nuclear programme. We are convinced this can be achieved only through diplomacy. That is why the European Union played a pivotal role in putting together the very substantial cooperation package Iran was offered in June 2006 with the backing of the United States, Russia and China. The European Union will continue to work for a peaceful solution to the crisis.
The European Union is well aware of the potential risks attached to the continued proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and is therefore in favour of drawing up multilateral guarantees for the supply of nuclear fuel. Initiatives of this kind could help convince countries interested in developing nuclear energy that there is no need to set up their own nuclear fuel cycle and it would make sense to renounce such an option.
To respond to the challenges I have outlined more effectively, the European Union plans to make even greater efforts to maintain and further strengthen the NPT regime. One way we are seeking to strengthen it is to take forward the discussion the European Union initiated on the consequences of Treaty withdrawal.
The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to agree on a substantive final document was clearly a missed opportunity, for action is urgently needed if the Treaty is to measure up to the daunting challenges facing the world today. That experience, however, must make the European Union all the more determined now to spare no effort to ensure that the 2010 Review Conference will be a success.
